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CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 
CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL 
Case No. LA CV18-10743 JAK (SKx) Date November 8, 2019 
Title Nirvana, LLC v. Mark Jacobs International , LLC, et al 
Present The Honorable JOHN A. KRONSTADT, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 
Andrea Ke ifer Not Reported 
Deputy Clerk Court Reporter I Recorder 
Attorneys Present for Plaintiffs: Attorneys Present for Defendants: 
Not Present Not Present 
Proceedings: (IN CHAMBERS) ORDER RE DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS (DKT. 
26) 
I. Introduction 
Plaintiff Nirvana L.L.C. ("Nirvana") advances four causes of action against Defendants Marc Jacobs 
International LLC ("Marc Jacobs"), Saks Incorporated (d/b/a Saks Fifth Avenue ), Neiman Marcus Group 
Limited, L.L.C., and Does 1 through 10 (col lectively, "Defendants"): (i) copyright infringement under 17 
U.S.C. §§ 101 , et seq. ; (ii) false designation of origin under the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1125(a), et 
seq.; (iii) trademark infringement under California common law; and (iv) unfair competition under 
California common law. Compla int, Okt. 1. 
On March 8, 2019, Defendants fi led a motion to dismiss the Complaint (the "Motion" (Okt. 26)) and an 
accompanying request for judicial notice (the "RJN" (Okt. 26-1)), which seeks consideration of eight 
documents in connection w ith the Motion. Nirvana filed separate oppositions to the Motion (Okt. 32) and 
the RJN (Okt. 33), and Defendants filed separate replies. Okts. 36, 37. A hearing on the Motion was 
conducted on June 10, 2019, and the matter was taken under submission. Okt. 42. For the reasons 
stated in this Order, the Motion is DENIED. 
II. Factual Background 
The Complaint alleges that Nirvana is a renowned rock band associated with, and credited for 
popularizing , the "alternative rock" and "grunge" musical genres. Complaint 1f 12. It is alleged that 
Nirvana owns a copyright in a "smiley face" design and logo (the "Happy Face").1 Complaint 1f 13. The 
Complaint alleges that the design and logo were created in 1991 by Nirvana singer and co-founder Kurt 
Cobain and reg istered in 1993 with the U.S. Copyright Office under number VA0000564166. Id. A copy 
of the March 11, 1993 registration, which states that it was created in 1991 and first published on 
November 1, 1991 , is attached to the Complaint. Exhibit 1 to Complaint (the "' 166 Registration"), 
Complaint at 17-24. The registration lists both the author and claimant of the copyright as "Nirvana, 
Inc." Id. at 22. It is for a tee shirt design, with the following deposit copy: 
1 The name of the design and logo as stated in the applicable registration ("Happy Face") is used throughout this 
Order to distinguish it from a reference to a generic "smiley face. " 
Page 1 of 19 
Case 2:18-cv-10743-JAK-SK   Document 60   Filed 11/08/19   Page 2 of 19   Page ID #:421
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 
CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL 
Case No. LA CV18-10743 JAK (SKx) 
Title Nirvana, LLC v. Mark Jacobs International , LLC, et al 
'166 Registration, Dkt. 1 at 24. 
Date November 8, 2019 
The Complaint alleges that Nirvana has used the Happy Face "continuously since 1992 to identify its 
music and licensed merchandise," and that it has also licensed the Happy Face to be used "both with 
and without ... the 'Nirvana' mark adjacent to the Happy Face design and logo." Complaint 'V 15. It is 
alleged that the "first use" was on "a poster advising of [a] release party for Nirvana's Nevermind 
album." Id. As a result of its use "to identity [N irvana 's] services and merchandise" for more than 25 
years , the Happy Face allegedly "has become widely associated with and identifies Nirvana as the 
source of the goods and services that bear [the design and logo] in the minds of the consuming public. " 
Complaint ~ 16. Nirvana alleges that through such ~extens ive use," Happy Face ~has come to 
symbolize the goodwill associated with Nirvana to a significant portion of the consuming public, which 
assumes that all goods or services that bear the logo are endorsed by or associated with Nirvana. " Id. 
The Complaint alleges that in or about November 2018, Marc Jacobs "announced the release of its 
'Bootleg Redux Grunge' cloth ing collection ." Id. ~ 17. It is alleged that this collection includes "items of 
cloth ing that utilize a design and logo virtually identical to Nirvana's copyrighted image, as shown" in 
the following images (the ~Accused Products") : 
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It is alleged that Marc Jacobs' products infringe Plaintiffs rights, and that Saks and Neiman Marcus, sell 
these infringing products. Id. 1M'J1 , 18. The alleged similarities between the material in which Plaintiff 
has intellectual property rights and Marc Jacobs' products includes Marc Jacobs' use of "a 'smiley face' 
image that is obviously similar to, and an intentional copy of, Nirvana's copyrights image . . . with the 
minor differences unl ikely to be noticed by the consuming public.H Id. ~ 18. In addition to the alleged 
use of a "virtually identica l copy of Nirvana's copyrighted image" on its products, Marc Jacobs also 
allegedly used Nirvana 's copyright image "more generally to promote" the overall collection "by making 
the Nirvana image the signature image used at promotional events. " Id. 11 19. 
It is also alleged that Marc Jacobs acted intentionally in the use of Nirvana 's copyrighted image on its 
products, and on the promotional materials for these products. Th is intentional conduct is alleged to be 
"part and parcel of a wider campaign to associate the entire 'Bootleg Redux Grunge ' collection with 
Nirvana, one of the founders of the "[g]runge" musical genre, so as to make the "[g]runge association 
with the collection more authentic." Id. 1120. It is alleged that these promotional materials "admitO the 
'bootleg' or unauthorized nature of these products" and further that promotional materials include 
"conspicuous reference[s)" to at least two Nirvana songs, "Smells Like Teen Spirit" and "Come As You 
Are ." Id. The Complaint further alleges that Marc Jacobs' use of the Happy Face is "calculated to 
mislead the public into falsely believing that Nirvana endorses the entire 'Bootleg Redux Grunge' 
collection and [the] products [in] that collection that display [the Happy Face] when Nirvana has not 
done so." Id. 1121. 
Marc Jacobs' uses of the Happy Face are allegedly "completely unauthorized. " Complaint 1121. 
Although Nirvana has demanded that Defendants cease and desist their use of the Happy Face, 
Defendants allegedly ignored these demands and then "expanded their wrongful activities. " Id. The 
Complaint alleges that due to Defendants' actions, Nirvana has suffered irreparable injuries, and the 
value of its licenses for the Happy Face is at risk of dilution. Id. 11 22. 
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As noted, based on these allegations, the Complaint advances four causes of action: (i) copyright 
infringement under 17 U.S.C. §§ 101 , et seq.; (ii) false designation of origin under the Lanham Act, 15 
U.S.C. §§ 1125(a), et seq.; (iii) trademark infringement under California common law; and (iv) unfair 
competition under California common law. 
III. Request for Judicial Notice 
Defendants request judicial notice of the following eight documents, for the following purposes: 
• Exhibit 1: United States Trademark Registration and Application for MJ MARC BY MARC 
JACOBS Smiley w ith M J Eyes, Ser. No. 79251585, held by Marc Jacobs; Defendants request 
notice of "the description of the mark to which this document relates, defendant MJl's trademark 
rights in the covered smiley face as evidenced by the existence of the internationa l trademark 
registration number shown in the document." Dkt. 37 at 3. 
• Exhibit 2: Business Information of Nirvana, L.L.C. (December 22, 1997, through present); 
Defendants request notice of "the identity of the governors of Nirvana, L.L.C." Dkt. 37 at 3. 
• Exhibit 3: Business Information of Nirvana, Inc. (January 26, 1990, through December 24, 
1997); Defendants request notice of "the identity of the governors of Nirvana, Inc." Dkt. 37 at 4. 
• Exhibit 4: A copy of the uncropped image of Nirvana's Nevermind album release poster; 
Defendants request notice that (i) this poster advertised a party on Friday, September 13; (ii) 
th is poster includes an "invitation"; and (ii i) the poster contains a copyright notice from the David 
Geffen Company. Dkt. 37 at 5. 
• Exhibit 5: The United States Copyright Registration for Nirvana 's Nevermind album, Reg . No. 
SR0000135335; Defendants request notice of the year of publication of the Nevermind album 
"to establish the year of its release. " Dkt. 37 at 5. 
• Exhibit 6: The United States Copyright Registration and album artwork for Nirvana 's album 
Bleach, Reg. No. SR0000300957; Defendants request notice of the year of publication of the 
Bleach album "to establish the word NIRVANA was used in the same font it is used in the '166 
Reg istration, and was publ ished, at least as ear1y as June 15, 1989." Dkt. 37 at 5. 
• Exhibit 7: The United States Trademark Application based on "intent to use" (ITU) for the X-Eye 
Happy Face, Ser. No. 88279690;2 Defendants request notice "ofthe full contents of Plaintiff's 
application for th is trademark. Dkt. 37 at 5; and 
• Exhibit 8: The United States Trademark Registration of the Harvey Ball smile, Ser. No. 
86253298. Defendants request notice of "the dates of registration and cancellation of the United 
States Trademark Reg istration of Harvey Ball smile" for a trademark once reg istered by a 
different entity for a design similar to the Happy Face. Dkt. 37 at 6-7. 
RJN , Dkt. 26-1 ; Reply re RJN, Dkt. 37; Notice of Errata, Dkt. 35. 
A court may "consider certain materials -- documents attached to the complaint, documents 
incorporated by reference in the complaint, or matters of judicial notice -- without converting the 
2 Defendants fi led a Notice of Errata in connection with their reply brief, that corrected Paragraph 7 and Exhibit 7 
of Defendants' Request for Judicial Notice. Notice of Errata, Dkt. 35. 
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motion. . into a motion for summary judgment. " United States v. Ritchie, 342 F.3d 903, 908 (9th Cir. 
2003). With respect to incorporation by reference , "[e]ven if a document is not attached to a complaint, 
it may be incorporated by reference into a complaint if the plaintiff refers extensively to the document or 
the document forms the basis of the plaintiff's claim. " Id. With respect to judicial notice, a court may 
take judicial notice of facts that are either (1) "generally known w ith in the trial court's territorial 
jurisdiction; or (2) can be accurate ly and readily determined from sources w hose accuracy cannot 
reasonably be questioned." Fed. R. Evid. 201 (b). Consideration of such materials ensures that 
"allegations that contradict matters properly subject to judicial notice or by exhibit" are not simply 
"accept[ed] as true" in connection w ith a motion to dismiss. SpreweJl v. Golden State Warriors , 266 F.3d 
979, 988 (9th CiL 2001). 
Defendants contend that the facts for which judicial notice is sought are generally based on "publicly 
ava ilable" documents the contents of w hich ''were controlled or supplied by Plaintiff. " Reply re RJN, Okt. 
37 at 3. Nirvana argues that judicial notice of these documents is inappropriate because each is "either 
irrelevant, disputed, or simply doles] not support the assertion in the Motion." Opposition to RJN , Okt. 
33 a15. 
In general, the facts as to which the RJN has been made are not material to the resolution of the 
Motion. Although many of them are official documents that may have certain ind icia of reliability, this is 
not sufficient to consider them in connection with a motion to dismiss. The Ninth Circuit has cautioned 
that "the unscrupulous use of extrinsic documents to resolve competing theories against the complaint 
risks premature dismissals of plaus ible claims that may turn out to be valid after discovery." Khoja v. 
Orexigen Therapeutics, Inc. , 899 F.3d 988, 998 (9th Cir. 2018). That describes most of the documents 
for which Defendants request judicial notice . Rather than contradicting allegations in the Compla int, 
most of these materials are being offered by Defendants in an attempt "to present the ir own version of 
the facts at the plead ing stage." Id. at 999. On this basis, the RJN is DENIED as to Exhibits 1, 2, 3, 6, 7, 
and 8 to the RJN. 
As to Exhibits 4 and 5 to the RJN , the outcome is different. The Complaint includes an allegation about 
the use of the Happy Face on a poster and incorporates a small image of a poster in w hich most of the 
text is not legible. See Complaint 1115. Exhibit 4 to the RJN is an image of this poster that is more 
legible and includes a portion of the poster omitted from the Complaint. Plaintiff has not contested the 
authenticity of this version of the poster. See Okt. 33 at 7-8. A review of the complete poster attached to 
the RJN is appropriate under the incorporation-by-reference doctrine. Cf. Knievel v. ESPN, 393 F.3d 
1068, 1076 (9th Cir. 2005) (proper to incorporate by reference context for allegedly defamatory photo 
and caption); see also Khoja , 899 F.3d at 1002 (incorporation-by-reference "prevents plaintiffs from 
se lecting only portions of documents that support their cla ims, while omitting portions of those 
documents that weaken -- or doom -- their claims") . Therefore, the RJN is GRANTED as to Exhibit 4, 
which can be considered in its entirety in connection w ith the Motion.3 Exhibit 5 is a copyright 
registration that , unl ike the other materials, provides relevant context from a source w hose accuracy 
cannot reasonably be questioned -- and has not been by Nirvana -- regard ing the year of the event 
3 One of the facts on Defendants seek to rely is that the poster contains a copyright notice from the David Geffen 
Company. Dkt. 37 at 5. That copyright notice is not legible on the version submitted by Defendants. See Dkt. 26-5 
at 2. However, whether such a copyright notice is on the exhibit is irrelevant to the issues presented by the 
Motion. 
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referred to in the aforementioned poster incorporated into the Compla int. Therefore, the RJN is also 
GRANTED as to the request that Exhibit 5 be reviewed for the limited purpose of establishing the year 
of the release of Nevermind. 
IV. Analysis 
A. Legal Standards 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a) provides that a "pleading that states a cla im for relief must contain .. . a short and 
plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. " The compla int must state 
facts sufficient to show that a claim for re lief is plausible on its face. Belf Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 
U.S. 544 , 570 (2007). The complaint need not include detailed factual allegations, but must provide 
more than a "formula ic recitation of the elements of a cause of action. " Id. at 555. "The plausibility 
standard is not akin to a 'probability requirement,' but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a 
defendant has acted unlawfully. Where a compla int pleads facts that are merely consistent w ith a 
defendant's liability, it stops short of the line between possibility and plausibil ity of entitlement to relief. " 
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). 
Pursuant to Fed . R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), a defendant may move to dismiss a compla int for failure to state a 
claim. Such a motion may be granted when the complaint lacks a cognizable legal theory or sufficient 
facts to support one. Mendiondo v. Centinela Hosp. Med. Ctr. , 521 F.3d 1097, 1104 (9th Cir. 2008). In 
considering a motion to dismiss, the allegations of the challenged compla int are deemed true and must 
be construed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. See Cahill v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 80 
F.3d 336, 337-38 (9th Cir. 1996). However, a court need not "accept as true allegations that contradict 
matters properly subject to judicial notice or by exhibit. Nor is the court required to accept as true 
allegations that are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable inferences." In 
re Gilead Scis. Sec. Litig., 536 F.3d 1049, 1055 (9th Cir. 2008) (cit ing Sprewell v. Golden State 
Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th CiL 2001 )). 
B. Application 
1. First Cause of Action: Copyright Infringement 
To establish copyright infringement, a plaintiff must show ownership of a valid copyright as to which 
there has been "copying of constituent elements of the work that are original. " Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. 
Rural Tel. Servo Co., 499 U.S. 340, 361 (1991 ); see also Swirsky v. Carey, 376 F.3d 841 , 844 (9th Cir. 
2004). Defendants challenge the allegations as to each of these elements. First, Defendants argue that 
Nirvana has failed adequately to allege that it is the owner of the '166 Registration. Dkt. 26 at 9. 
Second, Defendants argue that Nirvana has not and cannot adequate ly allege that the '166 
Reg istration is valid.ld. at 12. Third, Defendants argue that Nirvana has not and cannot plead extrinsic 
similarity between the '166 Registration and Defendants' products.ld. at 15. 
a) Ownership of Copyright 
Section 501 (b) of the Copyright Act establishes the general standing requirements for claims of 
infringement. See DRK Photo v. McGraw-Hili Glob. Educ. Holdings, LLC, 870 F.3d 978, 982-83 (9th 
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Cir. 2017).4 It provides, in relevant part , that "[t]he legal or beneficial owner of an exclusive right under 
a copyright is entitled, subject to the [registration] requirements of section 411 , to institute an action for 
any infringement of that particular right committed while he or she is the owner of it." 17 U.S.C. 
§ 501 (b). Accordingly, under Section 501 any party who owns any of the "exclusive rights" under 
Section 106 of the Copyright Act , or to whom such rights have been transferred , has standing to bring a 
corresponding infringement action . See Minden Pictures, Inc. v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 795 F.3d 997, 
1003 (9th Cir. 2015) (citing Sybersound Records, Inc. v. UAV Corp., 517 F.3d 1137, 1146 (9th Cir. 
2008)) . 
The Complaint sufficiently alleges that Nirvana is the owner of the '166 Registration. It is al leged that 
"[a]mong the copyrighted works owned by Nirvana is a 'Smiley Face' design and logo, Copyright 
Reg istration No. VA0000564166." Complaint 1113. The '166 Registration is attached to the Compla int. 
See '166 Reg istration, Dkt. 1 at 18-24. The registration lists as its initial author and claimant "Nirvana , 
Inc." Id. , Dkt. 1 at 20-22. It then states that the reg istration was assigned twice: first to "Nirvana" in 1997 
and then in 1998 to "Nirvana, L.L.C.," which is the Plaintiff in th is action. Id. at 22. These statements as 
to ownership are accepted as true in connection with the Motion. They are sufficient to establish that, 
for purposes of the issues raised by the Motion, Nirvana may prosecute this action as the owner of the 
rights conferred by the '166 Registration. 
Defendants' contrary position is unpersuasive. They note that, in addition to alleg ing ownership by 
Nirvana of the '166 Reg istration, the Complaint alleges that Kurt Cobain "created" the Happy Face in 
about 1991. Okt. 26 at 13; Complaint 1113. Defendants object that the Complaint is "silent," however, on 
the "important point" of "how or whether Mr. Cobain transferred his rights in the [Happy Face] to the 
authorlcopyright claimant listed on the '166 Registration : Nirvana, Inc: Dkt. 26 at 18. Such an 
allegation is not required to state a claim. 
Although the allegation as to Cobain's 1991 creation of the Happy Face may suggest that he was the 
"author" in whom "title vests initially: 17 U.S.C. § 201 (a), this does not preclude the possibility that 
Nirvana, Inc. later obta ined the right to cla im ownership of the 1993 '166 Registration, and then 
transferred that right to another entity from which it was transferred to Plaintiff. As Defendants 
acknowledge, this could have occurred if, for example, Cobain created a "work made for hire" for 
Nirvana, Inc. See 17 U.S.C. § 201 (b). That the Complaint does not specifically allege the process by 
which any such "work for hire" or similar arrangement resu lted in ownership by Nirvana, Inc. is not a 
''fatal" "omissionO."Okt. 26 at 18. The adequacy of Nirvana's "chain of title" is instead an issue to which 
Defendants may respond on its merits through discovery and subsequent proceedings. See Gym Door 
Repairs, Inc. v. Young Equip. Safes, Inc., 206 F. Supp. 3d 869, 894 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 12, 2016) ("To the 
extent defendants argue that plaintiff fa iled to allege an unbroken chain of title to the rights at issue, it is 
unnecessary for the complaint to include such detailed factua l recitation ." (quoting U2 Home Entm't, 
Inc. v. Kylin TV, Inc. , 2007 WL 2028108, at *7 (ED.N.Y. July 11 , 2007» ; see also 5 Wright & Miller, 
Federal Practice & Procedure § 1237 (3d ed.) ("Complaints [for copyright infringement] simply alleg ing 
present ownership by the plaintiff, registration in compliance w ith the applicable statute, and 
4 Defendants state that they "reserve their right to challenge Plaintiffs standing" under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). 
Motion, Dkt. 26 at 18 n.7. However, where the issue presented is whether a plaintiff has a statutory right to sue for 
infringement under the Copyright Act, a motion to dismiss is properly considered under Rule 12(b)(6). See Minden 
Pictures, Inc. v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 795 F.3d 997, 1001 (9th Cir. 2015). 
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infringement by the defendant, have been held sufficient under the rules. H ).5 
For the foregoing reasons, the Complaint adequately alleges Plaintiffs ownership of the '166 
Reg istration. 
b) Validity of the '166 Registration 
(1 ) Specific Legal Standards 
Reg istration of a copyright with the United States Copyright Office is not a condition of copyright ownership_ 
However, in general it is a prerequisite to the fil ing of a civil action for infringement, subject to certain 
exceptions. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 408(a), 411 (a); L.A. Printex Indus. , Inc. v. Aeropostale, Inc., 676 F.3d 
841 , 852 (9th Cir. 2012), as amended on denial of reh 'g and reh 'g en banc (June 13, 2012). 
"A copyright reg istration is 'prima facie evidence of the validity of the copyright and the facts stated in 
the certificate.'" United Fabrics Int'!, Inc. v. C&J Wear, Inc., 630 F.3d 1255, 1257 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting 17 
U.S.C. § 41 0(C» .6 "To rebut the presumption [of val idityj , an infringement defendant must simply offer some 
evidence or proof to dispute or deny the plaintiffs prima facie case of infringement. " Id. (quoting Lamps 
Plus, Inc. v. Seattle Ughting Fixture Co., 345 F.3d 1140, 1144 (9th Cir. 2003)). As the Ninth Circuit has 
recently explained: 
The Prioritizing Resources and Organization for Intellectual Property Act of 2008 (the "PRO IP 
Acf') amended the Copyright Act to include a new provision, 17 U.S.C. § 411 (b) (2008). Section 
411 (b) provides that a "certificate of registration satisfies the [reg istration requ irement 
of § 411 (a)], regard less of whether the certificate conta ins any inaccurate information," unless 
(1) "the inaccurate infonnation was included on the application for copyright reg istration with 
knowledge that it was inaccurate, " and (2) "the inaccuracy of the information, if known, would 
have caused the Register of Copyrights to refuse registration. " 17 U.S.C. § 411 (b)(1 ). 
Prior to the PRO IP Act, "we have held that 'inadvertent mistakes on registration certificates do 
not invalidate a copyright and thus do not bar infringement actions, unless the alleged infringer 
has re lied to its detriment on the mistake, or the claimant intended to defraud the Copyright 
Office by making the misstatement. '" L.A. Printex, 676 F.3d at 853 (quoting Urantia Found. v. 
Maaheffa, 114 F.3d 955, 963 (9th Cir. 1997» ; see also Unicolors, Inc. v. Urban Outfitters, Inc., 
853 F .3d 980, 991 (9th Cir. 2017) ("Good fa ith mistakes in copyright applications do not 
preclude an infringement action. ") . 
Gold Value Int'l Textile, Inc. v. Sanctuary Clothing, LLC, 925 F.3d 1140, 1144 (9th Cir. 2019). 
5 As discussed at the hearing, although the "chain of title" allegations are sufficient, this presents an issue for 
which prompt discovery is warranted. Plaintiffs counsel represented at the hearing that it would not requ ire a 
substantial amount of time to produce evidence that supports Plaintiffs position regarding "chain of title." 
Accord ingly, during the hearing an order was issued requiring counsel to meet and confer and file a report as to a 
process for focused discovery on this issue. See Okt. 42. That report was filed thereafter. Okt. 44. 
6 To constitute such prima facie evidence, the certificate of registration must be "made before or within five years 
after first publication of the work. " 17 U.S.C. § 410(c). 
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Defendants contend that the date of first publication stated on the '166 Registration -- November 1, 
1991 (see '166 Registration, Okt. 1 at 20) -- is not accurate. Defendants contend that the Happy Face is 
a "separate work" from the other components of the shirt, i.e., the Nirvana Logo and the language on 
the back of the shirt, and that "[t]he Complaint .. . admits that the [Happy Face] was published no later 
than Sept[ember] 13, 1991 on a poster to promote the then-upcoming release of Nirvana's Nevermind 
album on Sept[ember] 24, 1991 ." Okt. 26 at 21. They then contend that the add it ional standards to 
rebut Plaintiffs prima facie case are met for two reasons: (i) "[t]wo members of Nirvana , Inc. were 
members of the band Nirvana and it cannot be cred ibly argued that they did not know these dates;" and 
(ii ) had the Copyright Office been informed about the separate first publ ication date of the Happy Face, 
"it would have denied registration" because the sh irt would not have qualified as either a "sing le work" 
registration for a group of works or as a "group registration." Id. at 19-22 (citing , inter alia, 37 C.F.R. 
§ 202.3(b); and Olander Enters. , Inc. v. Spencer Gifts, LLC, 812 F. Supp. 2d 1070, 1075 (C .O. Cal. 
2011 )) . 
Nirvana disputes these contentions. First , it argues that its "first use [of the Happy Face] on a poster 
advising of [a] re lease party for Nirvana's Nevermind album" (Complaint, ~ 15) was not a "publication" 
as defined under the Copyright Act. Dkt. 32 at 10. Therefore, there is no discrepancy between the 
actual date of first publ ication and the one stated on the '166 Registration.ld. Second, "nothing in the 
Complaint provides any basis to find fraud ." Id. at 14-15. Th is is construed as a contention that 
Defendants have not shown that , if there were inaccurate information about the date of publication in 
the registration appl ication, "the inaccurate infonnation was included on the application for copyright 
registration with knowledge that it was inaccurate." 17 U.S.C. § 411 (b)(1 ). Third, even if the Happy 
Face was previously published on the poster, the Copyright Office would have issued the '166 
Reg istration as a va lid registration of a "derivative work. " Okt. 32 at 11 . Further, that the derivative work 
incorporated the Happy Face design and logo would provide separate protection both to the shirt 
design (the derivative work) and to the Happy Face design and logo (the underlying work). Id. at 11-
14.1 
(a) Whether the Happy Face Was Published Earlier than 
November 1, 1991 
The Copyright Act defines "Publication" as 
the distribution of copies or phonorecords of a work to the public by sa le or other transfer of 
ownership, or by rental , lease, or lending. The offering to distribute copies or phonorecords to a 
group of persons for purposes of further distribution, public performance, or public display, 
7 In the Motion, Defendants also argue that there is a separate inaccuracy in the stated date of publication 
because the Nirvana logo (the word "Nirvana" that appears above the Happy Face on the t-shirt design) was also 
published on a separate date, in 1989. Dkt. 26 at 14. However, Nirvana argued in opposition that this logo is not 
copyrightable because it is an individual word (Dkt. 32 at 10 n.4 ), and Defendants did not dispute that analysis in 
their reply. See Dkt. 36 at 4 n.3. Thus, the dispute distills to whether the '166 Registration is invalid for fai lure to 
disclose that the Happy Face was published earlier than the stated date of November 1, 1991. 
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constitutes publication. A public performance or display of a work does not of itse lf constitute 
publication. 
17 U.S.C. § 101. 
The Complaint alleges, through its incorporation of the attached '166 Registration, that the 
copyrightable material included in the application was first published on November 1, 1991 . See '166 
Registration, Okt. 1 at 18-24. This allegation regarding the publication date is presumed to be true in 
connection w ith review of the Motion. Because it was included on a registered copyright, it is also 
entitled to a presumption of validity . 
Defendants contend that th is allegation is inconsistent with the allegation that Nirvana ~first use [d) [the 
Happy Face] on a poster advising of [a] release party for Nirvana's Nevermind album." Complaint, 1f 15. 
It is not plausible to assume that this ~use" on the poster described in the Complaint occurred as late as 
November 1, 1991 . Review of Exhibits 4 and 5 to the RJN is appropriate for the limited purpose of 
establishing that the date of the ~release party" about which the poster "advis[ed]" was September 13, 
1991.6 Therefore, it is implausible that the "first use" of the Happy Face described in the Complaint, 
through inclusion on the poster, occurred later than September 13, 1991. However, that the Happy 
Face was used earlier than November 1, 1991 , does not show that it was published earlier than that 
date. As an allegation viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the poster could have been ~use[dr 
in severa l ways that would not have constituted publication. For example, the poster could have merely 
been "public[ly] . . . displayed," rather than distributed through "sale or other transfer of ownership" or by 
"offering to distribute" it for such purposes. 17 U.S.C. § 101. 
"To rebut the presumption [of validity], an infringement defendant must simply offer some evidence or proof 
to dispute or deny the plaintiffs prima facie case of infringement." United Fabrics, 630 F.3d at 1257. 
Therefore, Defendants bear the burden of producing evidence in support of their position that 
publication occurred earl ier than November 1, 1991. For example, evidence could be offered to support 
Defendants' contentions that the poster was "distributed for public display (Le. advertising the party) 
and further distribution (Le. , to fans as admission invitations)." Reply, Dkt. 36 at 4. However, no such 
evidence has been proffered, and the consideration of such evidence in connection w ith a motion to 
dismiss would be inappropriate. Moreover, Plaintiff plausibly has alleged that the first publication 
occurred on November 1, 1991 ; whether Defendants can show that there was actually an earl ier 
publication of the Happy Face is a fact issue that cannot be decided in connection with the Motion. 
A review of district court decisions in similar actions confirms that issues regarding validity of Pla intiffs 
registered copyright should not be resolved on a motion to dismiss. The infringement defendant "has 
the burden of rebutting the facts set forth in the copyright certificate ," which requires it to "offer some 
evidence or proof to dispute or deny the plaintiffs prima facie case of infringement." United Fabrics, 630 
F.3d at 1257 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). "Evidence or proof' about invalidity 
6 As noted, Exhibit 4 is a more leg ible version of the poster excerpted in the Complaint. It shows that the release 
party described was scheduled for September 13. Exh ibit 5 is the copyright registration for the Nevermind album 
in which a publication date in 1991 is listed. Viewed together, these exhibits support a reasonable inference that 
the poster described a release party that was to occur on September 13, 1991. Plaintiff does not dispute that this 
was the date of the event described in the illegible copy of the poster that is attached to the Complaint. 
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means that, in general , a determination that the presumption has been rebutted would not be made at 
the pleadings stage. See, e.g., S.O.S., Inc. v. Payday, Inc. , 886 F.2d 1081 , 1086 (9th Cir. 1989) ("The 
presumptive va lid ity of the certificate may be rebutted and defeated on summary judgment. ") (emphasis 
added); Bobosky v. Adidas AG, No. CV 10-630-PK, 2010 WL 4853295, al '11 n.3 (D. Or. Ocl. 8, 2010) 
("The parties argue at length in their briefing and oral argument over the validity of plaintiffs' copyright. 
. . . Since courts typically address the va lidity of a copyright at summary judgment, these arguments are 
premature."), report and recommendation adopted, No. CIV 10-630-PK, 2010 WL 4828392 (D. Or. Nov. 
18, 2010); Datastorm Techs., Inc. v. ExcaJiburCommc'ns, Inc., 888 F. Supp. 112, 114-15 (N.D. Cal. 
1995) ("While the Certificate only grants the holder the presumption of a val id copyright, such 
a presumption is strong in a motion to dismiss since the court must assume all factual allegations are 
true . .. . [A] determination w ill not be made at this time" as to whether the infringement defendant has 
rebutted the presumption of va lidity because "[t]o do so would requ ire the Court to go outside the 
pleadings and render a factual detennination. Such action is improper in a motion to dismiss for fa ilure 
to state a claim, and is more appropriate in a motion for summary judgment."). 
In certa in cases, this rule may not apply. See, e.g., Hyowon Elecs. , Inc. v. Eram, Inc, No. CV 13-8378 
GAF (SSX), 2014 WL 12560693, al'3 (CD . Cal. May 15, 2014) ("Plaintiff is not enlilled to [Ihe[ 
presumption of copyright va lidity . .. because it applied for the registration on October 21 , 2013, nearly 
eight years after the work was first publ ished on November 15, 2005."). However, those unique 
circumstances are not presented here. 
For the foregoing reasons, the Complaint adequately alleges that there are no inaccurate statements 
on the '166 Reg istration. Therefore, the Complaint adequately alleges that the '166 Reg istration is val id. 
(b) Whether an Inaccurate Date of Publication Was Included 
with Knowledge that It Was Inaccurate 
Because Defendants have not shown that the publication date listed on the '166 Registration was 
inaccurate, it is unnecessary to determine whether the applicant knew of any such inaccuracy. 
Moreover, even if this issue were reached, it is also one for which Defendants bear the burden of 
producing proof in response to prima facie showing of validity . In an attempt to meet th is burden, 
Defendants have presented documents that they contend link members of the band Nirvana with the 
entity that reg istered the copyright. Based on those documents, Defendants contend that "it cannot 
credibly be argued" that the registrant did not know about the separate date of publication for the 
poster. Motion, Dkt. 26 at 21 . Through this argument, Defendants have presented "their own version of 
the facts at the pleading stage." Khoja, 899 F.3d at 999. Such a review is inappropriate in connection 
with a motion to dismiss. 
(c) Whether the Copyright Office Would Have Issued the '166 
Reg istration if the Correct Date of Publication Had Been 
Included in the Application 
Because Defendants have not shown that the publication date listed on the '166 Registration was 
inaccurate, it is also unnecessary to determine whether, as Nirvana contends, the Copyright Office 
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would have nevertheless have issued the '166 Registration as a reg istration for a derivative work. 9 
c) Copying 
(1 ) Specific Legal Standards 
An infringement pla intiff must show "copying of constituent elements of the work that are origina l." Feist, 
499 U.S. at 361; see also Swirsky v. Carey, 376 F.3d 841 , 844 (9th Cir. 2004). The Ninth Circuit has 
clarified that the second element of copyright infr ingement involves two distinct and necessary 
components: "copying" and "unlawful appropriation. " Rentmeester v. Nike, Inc., 883 F.3d 1111, 1117 
(9th Cir. 2018) (cit ing Sid & Marty Krofft Television Productions, Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 
1157, 1164-65 (9th Cir. 1977)). Proof of copying is required because ~independent creation is a 
complete defense to copyright infringement.H Id. (cit ing Feist, 499 U.S. at 345-46). Proof of unlawful 
appropriation is required because certa in copying -- including the reproduction of ~ ideasH or "concepts" 
used in the plaintiffs work -- is not proh ibited by the Copyright Act.ld. (citing 17 U.S.C. § 102(b)) . 
Proof of copying and unlawful appropriation "involves fact-based showings that the defendant had 
'access' to the plaintiffs work and that the two works are 'substantially similar.' " Funky Films, Inc. v. 
Time Warner Entm't Co., 462 F.3d 1072, 1076 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Three Boys Music Corp. v. 
Bolton, 212 F.3d 477, 481 (9th Cir. 2000)). Infringement may also be established by demonstrating that 
the alleged infringers violated any ofthe exclusive rights granted to copyright holders under 17 U.S.C. 
§ 106. See Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1159 (9th Cir. 2007). 
The Ninth Circuit uses ~a two-part test to determine whether two works are substantially simila r: an 
extrinsic test and an intrinsic test. " Jada Toys, Inc. v. MatteI, Inc., 518 F.3d 628, 637 (9th Cir . 2008). 
The application of the substantial similarity tests has been described as follows: 
The extrinsic test assesses the objective similarities of the two works , focusing on ly on the 
protectable elements ofthe plaintiffs expression. Cavalier v. Random House, Inc., 297 F.3d 
815, 822 (9th Cir. 2002). Before that comparison can be made, the court must "filter our the 
unprotectable elements of the plaintiffs work -- primarily ideas and concepts, material in the 
public domain, and scenes a (aire (stock or standard features that are commonly associated 
with the treatment of a given subject). Id. at 822-23. The protectable elements that remain are 
then compared to correspond ing elements of the defendant's work to assess similarities in the 
objective details of the works. The intrinsic test requi res a more holistic, subjective comparison 
of the works to determine whether they are substantially similar in "tota l concept and feel. " Id. at 
9 Should this issue arise later in these proceedings, the parties should also address whether it is requ ired or 
appropriate to "request the Register of Copyrights to advise the court whether the inaccurate information, if 
known, would have caused the Register of Copyrights to refuse registration." 17 U.S.C. § 411 (b)(2 ). Several court 
have held that such a request must precede a final court determination as to invalidity of a reg istered copyright. 
See, e.g., DeliverMed Holdings, LLC v. Schaltenbrand, 734 F.3d 616, 624 (7th Cir. 2013); Gold Value Int'l Texile, 
Inc. v. Sanctuary Clothing, LLC, No. LA CV16-00339-JAK-FFM, 2017 WL 2903180, at *11 (CD. Cal. Mar. 24, 
2017), reconsideration denied, 2017 WL 3477746 (C.D. Cal. May 12, 2017), affd, 925 F.3d 1140. However, 
"courts can demand that the party seeking invalidation first establish that the other preconditions to invalidity are 
satisfied before obta ining the Register's advice on materiality." DeliverMed Holdings, 734 F.3d at 625. 
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822 (internal quotation marks omitted). To preva il, a pla intiff must prove substantial similarity 
under both tests. Funky Films, Inc. v. Time Warner Entertainment Co., 462 F.3d 1072, 1077 (9th 
CiL 2006). 
Rentmeester, 883 F.3d at 1118. "Only the extrinsic test's application may be decided by the court as a 
matter of law." Id. "The intrinsic test is left to the trier of fact. " Benay v. Warner Bros. Entm't, 607 F.3d 
620, 624 (91h CiL 2010). 
Although "dismissal of copyright infringement claims occurs more commonly at the summary judgment 
stage, . . . dismissal at the pleading stage is by no means unprecedented." Rentmeester, 883 F.3d at 
1123. Where the relevant materials are "properly before [the court] and thus 'capable of examination 
and comparison,'" it can in some cases be determined whether the materials are "as a matter of law not 
substantial1y similar." 'd. (quoting Christianson v. West Pub/'g Co., 149 F.2d 202, 203 (9th Cir. 1945)) . 
(2) Application 
Defendants argue that Nirvana has not and cou ld not plead facts sufficient to show extrinsic similarity 
between the Happy Face and al1egedly infringing art work on the Accused Products. Dkt. 26 at 22-23. 
They contend that "[t]he relevant comparison is between the entirety of the protectable elements of the 
'166 Registration and the artwork shown on each Accused Product." Id. at 23. As to that comparison, 
they argue that "[t]he only similarity" is "the use of a substantial1y circular outline for the smiley face and 
a squigg ly line used for a mouth, with a tongue sticking out. " 'd. 
Defendants' argument is unpersuasive; the Complaint sufficiently alleges the extrinsic test for 
substantial similarities. First, as to the filtering process by which unprotectable elements of the '166 
Reg istration are excluded, Defendants do not contend that any of the materials on Nirvana 's t-shirt 
design must be filtered out as unprotectable before engaging in the comparison. Thus, they do not 
contend that an element like the Happy Face design could be independently protectable, as well as 
protectable if combined in an origina l way with other elements of Plaintiffs t-shirt registration. Second, 
as to the degree of similarity between the t-shirt design that is the subject of the '166 Registration and 
Defendants' products, there are sufficient allegations as to this element, which are supported by 
corresponding images. The Complaint al1eges that the Accused Products "al1 use a 'smiley face' image 
that is obviously similar to, and an intentional copy of: the Happy Face. Compla int 1f 18. It also alleges 
that Defendants are using the infringing "smiley face" "on products obviously similar to licensed Nirvana 
products," such as sweatshirts and t-shirts. 'd. As to the similarities between the Nirvana Happy Face 
and the Accused Products' smiley face , a review of the images confirms that the allegation as to 
substantial similarity is sufficient: 
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Nirvana Happy Face 
(Complaint'll 14) 
Accused Products Happy Face 
(Complaint 1\18) 
The similarities between the two faces include: (i) "[t]he slightly asymmetrica l circle shape of the face"; 
(ii ) "the re latively w ide placement of the eyes"; (iii) "the distinctive 'squiggle' of the mouth"; and (iv) "the 
placement and use of a 'stuck out' tongue in the same shape on the same side of the mouth." 
Opposition, Dkt. 32 at 18. These featu res distinguish the Happy Face from the generic idea of a smiling 
face . It is also noteworthy that the Accused Products have combined this protectable artwork with other 
distinctive elements of the Nirvana t-shirt, including through the use of yellow lines on black background 
and a similar type and placement for the text above the image on the clothing. 
As to the two faces , the only discernible diffe rence is the use of "M J" eyes on Defendants' version 
instead of the "X" eyes used on the Plaintiffs work. This difference does not, as a matter of law, 
preclude Plaintiffs "substantia l similarity" claim . Cf. Malibu Textiles, Inc. v. Label Lane Int'!, Inc., 922 
F.3d 946, 953 (9th Cir. 2019) ("To be sure, the pictures do show some minor differences between the 
Subject Work and Defendants' works, such as in color, netting, and shape curvature. But a rational jury 
cou ld find that these differences result from the fabric-printing process generally and are 
inconsequential , or could credit [the plaintiff] 's assertion that these differences result in part from 
printing using cruder, lower-quality techniques and machinery. Alternatively, a jury could find these to 
be knowing modifications, which could be evidence of w illful copying.") (citations, internal quotation 
marks, and alterations omitted). 
Defendants present two related arguments in support of their position that the materials are not 
substantially similar. First, they contend that the '166 Reg istration must be compared in its entirety to 
the Accused Products. Okt. 26 at 23. They argue that because "the alleged similarity here relates only 
to a fraction of one ofthe three components of the '166 Registration," there is not substantial similarity. 
Id. However, "lilt is entire ly immaterial that, in many respects, plaintiff's and defendant's works are 
dissimilar, if in other respects , similarity as to a substantial element of plaintiffs work can be shown." 4 
Nimmer on Copyright § 13.03 (2019); see also Cavlier v. Random House, Inc., 297 F.3d 815, 825 (9th 
Cir. 2002) (although books taken as a whole do not infringe copyright, district court erred in find ing no 
substantial similarity as a matter of law between particular illustrations conta ined within them); cf. 
Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49, 56 (2d Cir. 1936), ("No plag iarist can excuse the 
wrong by showing how much of his work he did not pirate. H), cited with approval in 4 Nimmer § 13.03. 
Second, in their reply , Defendants construe Plaintiff's position to mean that the originality in the '166 
Reg istration is confined to its "combination of elements," rather than any "singular element of the '166 
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Reg istration" such as the Happy Face. Reply, Okt. 36 at 6-7. However, the Complaint alleges a 
protectable copyright in both the Happy Face and the t-shirt design on the '166 Registration. In the 
course of expla ining an alternative position, as to a different issue, that the '166 Registration cou ld be 
viewed as a derivative work, Pla intiffs opposition contended that the t-shirt design could be an "origina l 
combination of elements" even if those individual elements were not separately registered. Dkt. 32 at 
11 , 15-16. Plaintiff has also taken the position that even if the '166 Reg istration is a derivative work, the 
Happy Face is a copyrightable aspect of it whose infringement can be challenged notwithstand ing the 
absence of a separate reg istration for the Happy Face. Id. at 12. Therefore, Pla intiff has not conceded 
that the Happy Face is not independently protectable. Thus, it is appropriate to consider the similarities 
between the Accused Products and the Happy Face, as well as the other similarities described above. 
Because Defendants have not shown that those similarities are insubstantia l as a matter of law, the 
extrinsic test is sufficiently alleged. 
For the foregoing reasons , the Complaint adequately alleges that Defendants have copied original 
aspects of Plaintiffs copyrighted material . 
• • • 
The Complaint adequately alleges each of the elements of Plaintiffs copyright infringement claim. 
Therefore, the Motion is DENIED with respect to its challenge to the adequacy of the copyright cla im. 
2. Second through Fourth Causes of Action : Trademark-Related Cla ims 
Defendants contend that Plaintiffs trademark-related claims are not adequate ly pleaded , and are 
preempted by the Copyright Act. 
a) Adequacy of Allegations 
With respect to the adequacy of the allegations, the standards that apply to Pla intiffs second through 
fourth causes of action -- for fa lse designation of origin under Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 
California common law trademark infringement, and California common law unfair competition -- are the 
same in all relevant respects. See, e.g., Hokto Kinoko Co. v. Concord Farms, Inc., 810 F. Supp. 2d 
1013, 1031 (C.D. Cal . 2011 ) nnhe courts have uniformly held that common law and statutory 
trademark infringement are merely specific aspects of unfair competition. ") ; Grey v. Campbell Soup 
Co., 650 F. Supp. 1166, 1173 (C.D. Cal. 1986) ("The tests for infringement of a federally registered 
mark under § 32(1 ), 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1), infringement of a common law trademark, unfair competition 
under § 43(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a), and common law unfair competition involving trademarks are the 
same.") ; see also Cleary v. News Corp., 30 F.3d 1255, 1262-63 (9th Cir. 1994) ("state common law 
claims of unfair competition . .. are 'substantially congruent' to claims made under the Lanham Act. ") . 
Under those standards, there are two elements to Nirvana's claims: (i) Nirvana "has a valid , protectable 
trademark"; and (ii ) Defendants' use of the mark is like ly to cause confusion ." Applied Info. Scis. Corp. 
v. eBay, Inc., 511 F.3d 966, 969 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing Brookfield Commc'ns, Inc. v. West Coast Entm't 
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Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1053 (9th Cir. 1999» .10 Defendants challenge the adequacy of the allegations as 
to each of these elements. 
(1 ) Validity of Nirvana 's Trademark 
Defendants contend that there are insufficient allegations that Plaintiff used the Happy Face ~as a 
trademark" before the launch of the Accused Products. Motion, Okt. 26 at 28. They contend that the 
allegation that the Happy Face "identifies Nirvana as the source" of products including clothing 
containing the Happy Face (Complaint 1134) is insufficient because it does not aver that such use 
occurred "before the launch of the Accused Products.H Dkt. 26 at 28. They also rely on two matters not 
attached to the Compla int, and of which judicial notice has not been taken. They are offered in support 
of the position that Plaintiff did not use the Happy Face as a trademark before the launch of the 
Accused Products. The first is a federal trademark application filed recently by Plaintiff stating that it 
has an intent to use a design similar to the Happy Face on certa in products. The second is a cance led 
registration that had been issued to an entity that is not a party to this action, in which that party had 
alleged use of a similar smiley face design since 2009. Id. at 28-29. 
The Complaint includes sufficient allegations as to Nirvana's protectible interest in, and sen ior use in 
commerce of, the Happy Face. It alleges that Nirvana has used the Happy Face for more than 25 years 
"to identity its services and merchandise." Compla int ~ 16. As a result, it is alleged that the Happy Face 
is "widely associated with and identifies Nirvana as the source of the goods and services that bear it in 
the minds of the consuming public. " Id. It alleges that , notwithstand ing these many years of trademark 
use, Defendants began using the design and logo on the Accused Products in November 2018. Id. 
~ 17. 
Defendants' arguments to the contrary are premised on two documents, neither of which is proper to 
consider in connection with a motion to dismiss. As to Exhibit 7 to the RJN, it is irrelevant to the 
adequacy of the Complaint whether Plaintiff has made recent statements about an intent to use certain 
trademarks in the future. As to Exhibit 8, it is also irrelevant whether a different entity began using a 
similar trademark in 2009 -- a contention that Pla intiffs dispute, and that Exhibit 8 does not establ ish. 
The Complaint plausibly alleges trademark use during the past 25 years, on which the second through 
fourth causes of action are based. Whether Defendants can produce evidence to dispute those 
allegations, either by show ing any admissions to the contrary or sen ior trademark use by a different 
entity , is not relevant to the legal issues ra ised by the Motion. 
Defendants also argued at the hearing that the trademark allegations are insufficient because they are 
conclusory. Although there are not detailed allegations regarding , for example, the specific items on 
which trademark use occurred , the allegations meet the standards of Fed. R. Civ. P. 8. 
For the foregoing reasons, the Complaint adequately alleges that Plaintiff has a valid, protectable 
10 The Complaint does not allege infringement of any registered trademarks. However, "[a]n unregistered 
trademark can be enforced against would be infringers in several ways," including under § 43(a) of the Lanham 
Act and under state common law. Matal v. Tam , 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1753 (2017). Federal reg istration confers certain 
"legal rights and benefits," id. at 1754, but is not required in order to state a claim. 
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"rnhe critical determination [on a trademark infringement claim] is w hether an alleged trademark 
infringer's use of a mark creates a likelihood that the consuming public will be confused as to who 
makes what product. ~ Jada Toys, Inc. v. MatteI, Inc., 518 F.3d 628, 632 (9th Cir. 2008) (internal 
quotations and citations omitted). The Ninth Circuit applies the eight-factor Sleekcraft test to assess a 
likelihood of confusion . See AMF, Inc. v. Sfeekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341 , 348 (9th Cir . 1979), 
abrogation on other grounds recognized, Cairns v. Franklin Mint Co. , 292 F.3d 1139, 1150-51 (9th Cir. 
2002).11 The factors are: (1) the strength of the plaintiff's mark; (2) the relatedness or proximity of the 
goods; (3) the similarity of the marks ; (4 ) evidence of actua l confusion ; (5) the degree to w hich the 
parties' marketing channels converge; (6) the type of goods and degree of care purchasers are likely to 
exercise in selecting the goods; (7) evidence of the defendant's intent; and (8) the likelihood that the 
parties will expand their product lines. Id. at 348-349. 
The Complaint sufficiently alleges likelihood of confusion as to the source of the Accused Products. It 
alleges that the Accused Products use a ~virtually identical copyn of the design and logo that Nirvana 
has used on its "services and merchandisen for more than 25 years. Complaint mI 16, 19. It alleges that 
the Accused Products are similar to Nirvana's, including t-shirts and sweatsh irts . Id. 11 18. As described 
above with respect to the copyright cla ims, the allegations and images are sufficient to show substantial 
similarity. For similar reasons , it is plausible, based on these similarit ies, that a factfinder would find in 
favor of Nirvana as to w hether the "consuming public" wou ld incorrectly assume "that all goods or 
services that bear the logo are endorsed by or associated with Nirvana. " Id. 11 16. The question whether 
there is any "confusion as to w ho is the producer of the Accused Products" (Motion, Dkt. 26 at 30) 
presents a fact issue that cannot be resolved at th is stage of the litigation. Indeed, the Ninth Circuit has 
"cautioned aga inst granting summary judgment" where the analysis turns on the likelihood of consumer 
confusion. JL Beverage Co. , LLC v. Jim Beam Brands Co., 828 F.3d 1098, 1105 (9th Cir . 2016). To 
grant a motion to dismiss here would be inconsistent with the factual nature of the issue presented. 12 
Defendants' responsive argument distills to its position that the Accused Products include a 
modification to the Happy Face, through which the Happy Face's "X X" eyes are replaced with 
Defendants'"M J" eyes. See Motion , Dkt. 26 at 29-31 . However, the issue presented as to likelihood of 
confusion is not whether the marks are identical. It is whether they are sufficiently similar "in their 
enti rety" to make confusion like ly. See JL Beverage Co. , 828 F.3d at 1109. Whether a fact-finde r may 
11 In a "nominative fair use" case, where the "defendant has used the plaintiffs mark 'to describe the plaintiffs 
product' for the purpose of, for example, comparison to the defendant's product: a different nominative fair use 
analysis "replaces the Sleekcraft analysis." Caims, 292 F.3d at 1150-51 (emphasis in orig inal). 
12 Defendants have identified certain district court decisions in which trademark claims have been dismissed 
based on fai lure adequately to plead likelihood of confusion. While it is of course true that there may be cases in 
which the allegations as to likelihood of confusion are not plaus ible, Defendants have not identified any cases 
similar to this one in which a motion to dismiss was granted. See, e.g., Adobe Sys. Inc. v. A & S Eiecs., Inc. , No. 
e 15-2288 SBA, 2015 Wl13022288, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 19, 2015) (inadequate allegation of likelihood of 
confusion where "there are no allegations in the Complaint" that the product sold by defendant "is anything other 
than" the plaintiffs "genuine" product). 
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ult imately conclude that certain distinctions "render the marks dissimilar" cannot be resolved through 
the Motion because fact issues are presented. See id. at 1110. 
For the foregoing reasons, the Complaint adequately alleges likelihood of confusion. 13 
b) Preemption by the Copyright Act 
(1 ) Specific Legal Standards 
The Ninth Circuit has established a two-part test for determining whether a state law claim is preempted 
by the Copyright Act. First, the "subject matte r" of the state law cla im is assessed to determine whether 
it fal ls w ith in the subject matter of copyright as described in 17 U.S.C. §§ 102 and 103. Second, the 
rights asserted through the state claim are assessed to detennine whether they are equivalent to the 
rights described in 17 U.S.C. § 106. See Laws v. Sony Entm't, Inc., 48 F.3d 1134, 1137-38 (9th Cir . 
2006) (citing Downing v. Abercrombie & Fitch , 265 F.3d 994, 1003 (9th Cir. 2001 )). "If a state law claim 
includes an 'extra element' that makes the right asserted qualitatively different from those protected 
under the Copyright Act, the state law claim is not preempted by the Copyright Act. " Altera Corp. v. 
Clear Logic, Inc., 424 F.3d 1079, 1089 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing Summit Mach. Tool Mfg. v. Victor CNC 
Sys.,7 F.3d 1434, 1439-40 (9th CiL 1993)). 
(2) Application 
The Copyright Act does not preempt any of the other claims advanced in the Complaint. The Lanham 
Act claim cannot be preempted by the Copyright Act . With an exception not relevant here, "noth ing in 
[the preemption provision] or elsewhere in the [Copyright] Act annuls or limits any rights or remedies 
under any other Federal Statute." 1 Nimmer on Copyright § 1.19 (2019) (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 301 (d» . 
This includes the Lanham Act. Id. The Lanham Act is construed to avoid "over-extension of trademark 
and re lated protections into areas trad itionally occupied by copyright ." Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth 
Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 34 (2003); see also Shaw v. Lindheim, 919 F.2d 1353, 1364-65 
(9th Cir. 1990) ("declin[ing] to expand the scope of the Lanham Act to cover cases in which the Federa l 
Copyright Act provides an adequate remedy"). However, such a construction is based on the Lanham 
Act itse lf , and not on a preemption analysis. 
The "preemption" argument could be deemed as one presented as the veh icle to contend that Plaintiff's 
trademark-related claims overlap entire ly w ith the copyright claim. Thus, it could be seen as asserting 
that the state law trademark claims are missing the "extra elemenr requ ired to preclude preemption, 
and the Lanham Act claim is premised on an "over-extension" of that act into the domain of copyright. 
However, there are sufficient allegations as to the distinct elements required to state a trademark claim. 
The Complaints adequately alleges both a trademark use of the Happy Face and likelihood of 
confusion through Defendants' use of the Accused Products. Because these allegations go to 
13 Defendants separately challenge the adequacy of Plaintiffs plead ing under a "passing off theory. The 
arguments as to this issue overlap with those presented as to likelihood of confusion. Accordingly, this argument 
is unpersuasive for the same reason -- to the extent Nirvana seeks relief under a "passing off theory, there are 
plausible allegations that consumers wou ld be confused about whether Defendants have "passed off their goods 
as ones affiliated with Nirvana. 
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"elements not found in federal copyright law,H they are neither outside the scope of trademark law nor 
preempted. See 1 McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition § 6:15 (5th ed.); cf. Warner Bros. 
Entm't v. X One X Prods. , 840 F.3d 971 , 980 (8th Cir. 2016) (alleged infringer's products "employ iconic 
film characters' pictu res to associate the products with [the plaintiffs] films, not to copy the film itself. 
Accordingly, these are trademark claims, not disguised copyright claims, and Dastardoes not bar 
them. ") This determination is also consistent with the principle that "Congress created two separate 
statutory schemes to govern copyrights and trademarks; in order to effectuate the purposes of both 
statutes, damages may be awarded under both." Nintendo of Am. , Inc. v. Dragon Pac. Int'l, 40 F.3d 
1007, 1011 (9th Cir. 1994); see also Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., Inc. , 529 U.S. 205, 21 6 
(2000); Mercado Latino, Inc. v. Indio Prod., Inc., 649 Fed. Appx. 633, 633-35 (9th Cir. 2016) (discussing 
applicable authority). 
Defendants re ly on Lions Gate Entm't Inc. v. TO Ameritrade Servs. Co., Inc., 170 F. Supp. 3d 1249 
(CD . Cal. 2016), on reconsideration in part, No. CV 15-05024 DDP (EX), 2016 WL 4134495 (CD. Cal. 
Aug. 1, 20 16). However, in Lions Gate, the trademark-related claims did not include any plausible 
allegation of consumer confusion; the plaintiff "[did] not allege it practices or licenses" any services 
similar to those provided by the defendants. 170 F. Supp. 3d at 1267. 
Because the Complaint adequate ly alleges the elements of Pla intiff's trademark-related claims and 
Defendants have not shown that those claims are preempted by the Copyright Act, the Motion is 
DENIED with respect to its challenge to the adequacy of the trademark-re lated cla ims. 
V. Conclusion 
For the reasons stated in this Order, the Motion is DENIED. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
Initials of Preparer ---"aC.k _______ _ 
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